See how open object rexx compares to other vendors in security performance
In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI relies on a world-writable /tmp file unless XDGRUNTIMEDIR is set, or localhost TCP port 10010, allowing RXAPI communication by any local user, e.g., for injection of a macro that will be executed by a REXX script.
In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI mishandles nameArg and userid bounds checking, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution via crafted messages.
In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI has a heap buffer over-read in a QueueManager DataQueue::addmethod. In particular, the code blindly trusts the message.parameter1 value provided by the client as the size used to fill the data from the queueData heap buffer. An attacker sends a large parameter1 value in an ADDTOSESSIONQUEUE or ADDTONAMEDQUEUE message and then retrieves data with a PULLFROMSESSIONQUEUE message. (A very large value causes a process crash.)