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Vendor Risk Score

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Severity
9.3
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI relies on a world-writable /tmp file unless XDGRUNTIMEDIR is set, or localhost TCP port 10010, allowing RXAPI communication by any local user, e.g., for injection of a macro that will be executed by a REXX script.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.3
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI mishandles nameArg and userid bounds checking, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution via crafted messages.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.9
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L

In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI has a heap buffer over-read in a QueueManager DataQueue::addmethod. In particular, the code blindly trusts the message.parameter1 value provided by the client as the size used to fill the data from the queueData heap buffer. An attacker sends a large parameter1 value in an ADDTOSESSIONQUEUE or ADDTONAMEDQUEUE message and then retrieves data with a PULLFROMSESSIONQUEUE message. (A very large value causes a process crash.)

First published (updated )

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